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THE UK FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR: A MODEL FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE 
REGULATION? 
 
Dr. Carole McCartney* & Emmanuel Amoako† 
Abstract 
 
The utilization of an array of scientific techniques and technologies is now considered 
customary within criminal justice, with technological developments and scientific advancements 
regularly added to the crime investigator’s arsenal. However, the scientific basis, reliability, and 
fallibility of the application of such “forensic science” (and the resulting scientific evidence) 
continues to come under intense scrutiny. In response to apparently irremediable problems with the 
quality of scientific evidence in the UK, the government created the role of “Forensic Science 
Regulator” in 2007. The introduction of a Regulator was intended to establish quality standards for 
all forensic science providers in the UK, create a level playing field in the forensic services market, 
and grant assurances that all providers were producing reliable and robust scientific evidence. A 
decade on, there remain questions over the effectiveness of this model of forensic regulation. While 
there has been significant progress with initial aims and objectives and broad stakeholder 
engagement, the Regulator still lacks meaningful powers, and significant gaps in regulation remain. 
Accreditation is not only inconsistent but may be superficial. The Regulator faces serious resource 
restrictions with debilitating limitations on the Regulator’s capacities, while wider austerity 
measures throughout the criminal justice system hamper efforts to raise standards in forensic 
science. This Article will detail the first ten years of the Forensic Science Regulator, outlining 
successes and ongoing challenges. It will demonstrate that the UK model of forensic regulation has 
proven only partially effective at minimizing the risks associated with forensic science, while 
ensuring that the criminal justice system can continue to secure high quality forensic scientific 
evidence that is robust, reliable, and sustainable. 
                                                          
* Reader in Law, School of Law, Northumbria University. 
† PhD Candidate, School of Law, Northumbria University.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While the forensic potential of scientific knowledge, experimentation, and testing has long 
been recognized, the reliability of forensic scientific evidence1 has come under intense scrutiny in 
recent years. Considered a “state of the union” report with broad acceptance and international 
pertinence, the 2009 United States National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report criticized inter alia: 
the paucity of underlying research; lack of standards and accreditation of laboratories; dramatic 
inconsistencies in levels of training of forensic personnel; inattention to risks posed by cognitive 
contamination (so-called contextual bias); unprincipled variation in terminology and forms of 
expression of scientific opinions; widespread failures to disclose limitations and uncertainties in 
reports and testimony; insufficient detail and explanation in reports; and a general lack of funding 
and leadership across the forensic sciences.2 In late 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (PCAST) released a further damning report on forensic science, focusing on 
the lack of validity of many forensic science techniques.3 Such concerns are mirrored around the 
globe. In a comparative study of forensic practice in the United States, Switzerland, and Australia, 
Edmond and Vuille suggest that critical failings in forensic science are ubiquitous.4 Yet, even 
domestic attempts to regulate forensic science remain in their infancy, with any international 
oversight scarcer still and of limited impact.   
Perhaps uniquely,5 the UK6 has dedicated efforts to answering critics of forensic science by 
attempting to ensure uniform provision of high quality forensic scientific evidence, primarily through 
                                                          
1 We use the term “forensic scientific evidence” to encompass all evidence utilized within the 
criminal justice process that has been undertaken by “forensic practitioners” or generated using 
recognized “forensic” techniques or applications. There is a lot of “scientific evidence” that would 
not fit under this banner, such as medical evidence, or evidence of engineers, etc. However, the term 
“forensic evidence” is often cast far wider, and includes evidence that most people would not 
recognize as being generated by “forensic science” techniques. We hope that “forensic scientific 
evidence” is thus broad enough to include all forensic disciplines and techniques but not so broad as 
to encompass all potential evidence.  
2 See generally, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD] 
3 See generally, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH. (PCAST), EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: 
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016). 
4 Gary Edmond & Joelle Vuille, Comparing the Use of Forensic Science Evidence in Australia, 
Switzerland & the United States: Transcending the Adversarial/Non-Adversarial Dichotomy 54 
JURIMETRICS J. 221, 251 (2014). 
5 Although we cannot say definitively, we are currently unaware of any international 
counterparts or equivalent efforts that have taken the same approach to forensic science regulation in 
other countries.  
6 The Forensic Science Regulator has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but both Scotland 
and Northern Ireland voluntarily agreed to work in partnership with the Regulator and continue to 
work within the same guidelines. About Us, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about, 
[https://perma.cc/Y95J-FMC7] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
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the creation of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR). Established in 2007, the Forensic Science 
Regulator (FSR or the Regulator) was tasked with establishing and monitoring quality standards and 
ensuring the accreditation of suppliers of forensic services as well as dealing with complaints and 
providing advice to the government.7 However, there remain questions over whether the regulatory 
model adopted is effective. On the one hand, the FSR was meant to create generic standards for all 
forensic science providers in the UK and provide “a light touch” in steering forensic service 
providers towards adopting effective quality assurance systems and gaining appropriate 
accreditation.8 But has this “light touch” rendered the Regulator a paper tiger, leaving gaps in 
regulation and providing superficial accreditation? Along with the rest of the public sector in the UK, 
the Regulator also faces serious resource restrictions and operates within a broader criminal justice 
system simultaneously being starved of government funding.  
This Article details the work of the first ten years of the FSR, summarizing successes and 
ongoing challenges. It questions whether the Regulator has achieved the aim of ensuring high quality 
forensic science provision via examination of annual reports and business plans as well as related 
documents, and it considers issues pertaining to forensic science provision in the UK to draw 
conclusions regarding the success of the regulation model employed.  
 
I.   CREATING THE FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR 
 
During the massive expansion of forensic science provision in England and Wales in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, there were a series of highly critical reports commenting 
upon the quality of forensic science provision and the risks associated with poor quality forensic 
scientific evidence. The 1993 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (the Runciman 
Report), established in light of a series of infamous “Irish terrorism” miscarriages of justice, made 
thirteen recommendations specific to forensic science.9 Of these, the establishment of an oversight 
body was deemed a priority. The Runciman Report recommended the creation of a Forensic Science 
Advisory Council (FSAC) to serve as a regulatory body for the forensic science community and an 
independent source of advice.10 Just three years later, the 1996 Assessment and Implications of 
Centrifuge Contamination in the Trace Explosive Section of the Forensic Explosives Laboratory at 
Fort Halstead (the Caddy Report) evaluated the serious contamination at a military forensic 
explosives laboratory and advocated registration of individual forensic practitioners, while also 
recommending the creation of an Inspectorate of Forensic Sciences.11  
It was not until 1999, however, that any reforms were initiated, with the establishment of the 
Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP). This register was intended to provide 
courts with a single point of reference through publication of a list of “competent” forensic 
practitioners; ensure that registered practitioners maintained competence; and discipline registered 
practitioners who did not meet the required standards of “safe, competent practice.”12 The CRFP 
                                                          
7 ANDREW RENNISON, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN 2008/09-2010/11 at 
1, 2 (2008), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118922/Forensic_Scie
nce_Regulator_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2P7-NCMR] [hereinafter BUSINESS PLAN 2008]. 
8  Id. at 3. 
9 THE ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST., REPORT, 1991, CM 2263, at 211 (UK). 
10 Id. 
11 BRIAN CADDY, ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRIFUGE CONTAMINATION IN THE 
TRACE EXPLOSIVE SECTION OF THE FORENSIC EXPLOSIVES LABORATORY AT FORT HALSTEAD 6–7, 23, 
42 (1996). 
12 ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, A REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS FOR THE 
ACCREDITATION OF FORENSIC PRACTITIONERS 17 (2009), 
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/Review-of-Forensic-Practiti1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DGZ-9DJQ]. 
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would thus assure courts that those presenting themselves at trial as expert witnesses were competent 
to fulfill that role and was welcomed as an important step in that regard. However, as a voluntary and 
self-selective system of individual accreditation, the CRFP stopped far short of bringing 
comprehensive and rigorous scrutiny to bear upon forensic science and expert witnesses, many of 
whom were still able to testify in court regardless of their registration status.13 The register was 
therefore impotent, and continuing efforts to register practitioners were proving futile. And so, the 
CRFP, ostensibly due to financial difficulties, closed in 2009.14  
Meanwhile in November 2004, in response to rapid developments in the forensic marketplace 
prompted by the partial privatization of the previously publicly funded national Forensic Science 
Service15 and the criticisms of the continued lack of regulation in light of high-profile miscarriages of 
justice involving “experts,” the UK Forensic Science Society changed its status to one of a 
professional body.16 The Forensic Science Society partially took up the role played by the CRFP by 
launching a Continuing Professional Development scheme for members, a requirement of Chartered 
Forensic Practitioner status.17 Although bodies, such as the Chartered Society, aim to promote and 
develop forensic science quality standards and practice, they represent a wider body of interests, 
including forensic education and management, and do not provide specific certification or assurance 
of practitioner competence.  
With neither the Runciman Report’s nor the Caddy Report’s recommendations leading to a 
regulatory body beyond the deficient CRFP and with criticism of forensic science unabated, the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee (Select Committee) revisited the 
issue in its 2005 report Forensic Science on Trial, making sixty recommendations on the regulation 
of forensic science, the training of scientists, and related issues.18 The Select Committee again 
recommended that the government establish a FSAC to oversee forensic science and provide 
independent and impartial advice.19 The FSAC would also be ideally placed to review, or to 
commission inspections of, the use of forensic science across the whole of the criminal justice system 
and to propose improvements where necessary. After consultation subsequent to the report, the 
government decided that a named individual would be appointed Regulator, emulating other 
regulatory structures, with responsibility for overseeing the quality of forensic science in England 
and Wales.20 The new role was announced in July 2007, explaining that the officeholder would 
advise the government and criminal justice system on standards; identify and create new or improved 
quality standards; provide advice and guidance to providers on how to demonstrate compliance; and 
                                                          
13 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE ON TRIAL, 2004–05, HC 96-I, at 
62–63 (UK). 
14 Jamie Doward, Forensic Science Skills Threatened by Funding Withdrawal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 
4, 2009, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2009/apr/05/forensic-science-government-
funding [https://perma.cc/ED5D-9JHE]. 
15 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE ON TRIAL, 2004–05, HC 96-II, at 
Ev 26 (UK). The Forensic Science Service became a “Government Owned Company,” a for-profit 
company, wholly owned by the UK Government, with the intention being to sell to a private interest 
in the coming years. Id. at Ev 3. 
16 About Us, CHARTERED SOC’Y OF FORENSIC SCIS., http://www.csofs.org/About-us 
[https://perma.cc/8DGL-47BN] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
17 Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC), CHARTERED SOC’Y OF FORENSIC SCIS., 
http://www.csofs.org/Certificate-of-Professional-Competence-CPC [https://perma.cc/FB8A-FZ6R] 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
18 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 82–89.  
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Id. at 5. 
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ensure the monitoring of such standards.21 The Regulator was to be supported by a FSAC with 
members from stakeholder bodies.22  
 
A. The Role and Objectives of the Forensic Science Regulator 
 
The first business plan of the new FSR in March 2008 outlined the role of the Regulator and a 
set of objectives as well as a plan for the first two years of operation.23 The FSR began by identifying 
what the criminal justice system requires of forensic science providers:  
 
i). The delivery of forensic science services, using the appropriate available scientific 
techniques, according to the highest professional standards;  
ii). With efficiency, integrity, impartiality and accuracy at every stage throughout the 
process;  
iii). At a cost which represents best value for money, within timescales which meet 
operational needs;  
iv). Reflecting an understanding of the needs of the specific customer and the 
requirements of the [criminal justice system] as a whole; thereby  
v). Maintaining and enhancing public confidence in the quality and reliability of 
forensic science in the [criminal justice system].24  
 
To ensure that the forensic science market could deliver on each of these requirements, the FSR 
outlined a remit that would encompass:  
 
i). Scientific quality standards relating to organi[z]ations providing forensic science 
services to the [criminal justice system];  
ii). Processes carried out within those organi[z]ations which affect the quality of the 
forensic science services provided to the [criminal justice system];  
iii). New scientific techniques introduced in, or adopted by, such organi[z]ations, 
before those techniques are introduced; [and] 
iv). The competence of individual forensic scientists.25  
 
It was not expected that the FSR deliver all activities directly, but that if organizations or mechanisms 
already existed to create and monitor standards etc., that these would be utilized.  
In the first Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report, published in December 2009, the FSR 
set out a vision “[t]hat forensic science delivered to the criminal justice system in the UK will 
consistently meet the high quality standards and integrity expected by the courts and the general 
public.”26 To achieve this, the FSR was to:  
• “Provide direction and unity of approach to achieving forensic science quality standards 
across the UK;  
• Place quality at the cent[er] of all forensic science activities; and  
                                                          
21 12 Jul. 2007, Parl Deb HC (2007) col. 67WS (UK), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070712/wmstext/70712m0002.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WQ9R-QPJT]. 
22 Id. 
23 BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 1, 2, 18. 
24 Id. at 1. 
25 Id. at 20. 
26 ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR ANNUAL REPORT: DECEMBER 2009 at 1 
(2009), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118900/FSR-
annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B42X-4H9V]. 
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• Create a quality standards framework around the full range of forensic processes.”27  
 
The FSR’s mission was:  
 
• To influence the strategic management of UK forensic science to place quality 
standards at the heart of strategic planning;  
• To develop a set of ‘industry specific’ quality standards for all forensic processes 
across the dimensions of provider, practitioner and method;  
• To establish, through the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), 
effective compliance assessment procedures;  
• To use the Forensic Science Advisory Council as a source of independent and 
authoritative advice;  
• To maintain the use of specialist groups of domain experts as the vehicle to deliver 
valid quality standards; and  
• To engage with the full range of stakeholders in order to consult widely.28 
In February 2013, the second Forensic Science Regulator Business Plan: 2012 to 201729 was 
swiftly followed by the third Forensic Science Regulator Business Plan: 2013 to 2014,30 when a 
change of personnel took place and the new Regulator set out their priorities.31 Each document 
outlined aims accompanied by plans to achieve these aims.  Both individuals who have acted in the 
role of Regulator32 have stressed the importance of engagement with stakeholders, and they regularly 
meet with “specialist working groups”: forensic science practitioners, specialists, experts, and other 
stakeholders who can undertake their own studies and advise the Regulator on quality standards for 
specific forensic disciplines within the wider forensic services to ensure industry-specific quality 
standards. The current groups, each with their own terms of reference, are:   
 
(1) The FSAC, 
(2) The Contamination Specialist Group, 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN: 2012 TO 2017, 
(2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/143740/business-plan-
2012-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV5Y-G5AB]. 
30 FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN: 2013 TO 2014, 
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229450/fsr-
business-plan-1314.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY6B-ZMBF]. 
31 These ‘Business Plans’ also appeared to fulfill the role of ‘Annual Reports,’ where accounts 
and progress would be reported as well as upcoming plans and there were no Annual Reports 
published between 2010 and 2015. 
32 There was an ‘interim’ Regulator to set-up the FSR. Forensic Science Regulator Newsletter, 3 
FORENSIC SCI. REG. UNIT, Sept. 12, 2007, at 1, 2, http://netk.net.au/Forensic/UKFSAC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YYX5-NZCC]. The first Regulator was Mr. Andrew Rennison. 521 Parl Deb HC 
(2011) col. 23WS (UK), https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-01-
13/debates/11011364000012/ForensicScienceRegulator [https://perma.cc/5JN3-RS8S]. Rennison was 
followed by Dr. Gillian Tully, who took up the role in 2013, and has recently been confirmed as 
Regulator until 2020. Forensic Sci. Regulator, Dr. Gillian Tully Reappointed in Key Role for Setting 
Standards in Forensic Science, GOV.UK (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dr-
gillian-tully-reappointed-in-key-role-for-setting-standards-for-forensic-science 
[https://perma.cc/2L8T-QSLD]. 
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(3) The Fingerprint Quality Specialist Group, 
(4) The Digital Forensics Specialist Group, 
(5) The DNA Analysis Specialist Group, 
(6) The End User Specialist Group, 
(7) The Forensic Pathology Specialist Group, 
(8) The Medical Forensics Specialist Group, 
(9) The Quality Standards Specialist Group, and 
(10) The Evidence Assessment Specialist Group.33 
 
Despite slight variations in visions and differing aims over the ten years since inception, the 
FSR role has not altered in any material way. The Regulator continues to be a public appointee and 
operates independently (i.e., not influenced by political pressure) working at arm’s length of the 
Home Office.34 However, the FSR is funded by the Home Office, and the Regulator reports to the 
Home Secretary and is supported by three civil servants, (suggesting quite a short “arm”).35 The 
Regulator also acts as an advisor to the government and represents the UK in international fora.36 The 
FSR’s responsibilities as currently articulated on the FSR website include the following:  
 
• “[I]dentifying the requirement for new or improved quality standards[;] 
• [L]eading on the development of new standards[; and] 
• [W]here necessary, providing advice and guidance so that providers of forensic science services 
can demonstrate compliance with common standards[,]”37 
 
with attendant priorities to see that:  
 
• [F]orensic science services are delivered to appropriate standards (usually an 
international standard) tailored to meet the needs of the criminal justice system 
and subject to independent and effective assessments of quality[;] 
• [H]igh quality advice and guidance is provided to forensic science providers, 
ministers and others on the forensic science requirements of the criminal justice 
system[;] 
• [T]here are effective means to investigate quality failures and to address any 
issues[;] 
• [T]here is effective collaboration with the authorities in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland to achieve UK-wide quality standards[; and] 
• [T]he UK is a strong voice on projects to develop European or international 
standards for forensic science.38 
 
In the discharge of these duties, the FSR continues to be advised and supported by the FSAC, and 
quality standards are established via the support of the nine specialist working groups.39 
The principal and immediate task of the FSR was to develop quality standards encompassing 
forensic science providers, practitioners, and forensic methods. The FSR was charged with producing 
a “Manual of Regulation,” defined as “a consolidated set of guidance which describes, in some detail, 
                                                          
33 Membership, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about/membership 
[https://perma.cc/A54D-SQB4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
34 Id. 
35 About Us, supra note 6. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Membership, supra note 33. 
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why (covering strategic aims and objectives) [and] how (including statement of principles to be 
adopted) the Regulator, advised by the FSAC and supported by Specialist Groups, will manage the 
whole regulatory process.”40 In 2011, Version 1 of the FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct for 
Forensic Science Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal Justice System (the Codes) were 
published, setting out accreditation requirements for laboratories; a “Code of Conduct” for 
practitioners, and a similar “Code of Practice” for providers.41  
The Codes are built on the international standards ISO 17025:2005 (which outlines the 
general requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories), as interpreted by 
ILAC G19:08/2014 in the context of forensic science processes42 and ISO 17020 for organizations 
carrying out inspection.43 The Regulator oversees accreditation (via the UKAS) using the 
international laboratory testing ISO17025 standard for all laboratories that supply forensic services.44 
Because ISO17025 constitutes a generic framework not specific to forensic laboratories, UKAS has 
issued supplementary standards and has made tailored modifications for forensic science.  Both 
forensic anthropology45 and forensic pathology46 have their own specific Codes of Practice, while 
there are also appendices to the Codes for some disciplines, including: 
 
(1) Bloodstain pattern analysis, 
(2) DNA analysis, 
(3) Digital forensic services, 
(4) Video analysis, 
(5) Speech and audio forensic services,  
(6) Cell site analysis, 
(7) Fingerprint comparison, and 
(8) Fingermark visualization and imaging.47  
 
Accreditation of providers involves on-site assessment by technically competent assessors 
across a range of forensic disciplines, assessing the training and ongoing competence of practitioners 
within the organization, the validation of methods and tests undertaken by the organization, and 
evidence of impartiality in the organization’s activities.48 Assessment is managed on a four-year 
cycle with at least annual on-site visits by UKAS.49 Quality-related issues resulting from this 
                                                          
40 BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7. 
41 FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 6 (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118949/codes-
practice-conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/348J-TAP7] [hereinafter CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT]. 
42 FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 2 (2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/499850/2016_2_11_-
_The_Codes_of_Practice_and_Conduct_-_Issue_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9XA-BTXZ]. 
43 Id. at 12. 
44 Id. 
45 Code of Practice for Forensic Anthropology, GOV.UK, (Oct. 3, 2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/code-of-practice-for-forensic-anthropology 
[https://perma.cc/S7LD-3A7N]. 
46 Forensic Pathology: Code of Practice, GOV.UK, (Nov. 20, 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/standards-for-forensic-pathology-in-england-wales-
and-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/EN34-J3EE]. 
47 Forensic Science Provider: Codes of Practice and Conduct, GOV.UK, (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-science-providers-codes-of-practice-and-
conduct#appendices [https://perma.cc/W9LU-LGW5]. 
48 Codes of Practice and Conduct, supra note 42.  
49 ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FSR-R-618, REPORT INTO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF A COMPLAINT RECEIVED FROM THE GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE ON 7 MARCH 
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independent accreditation assessment are reported to the FSR.50 Accreditation is thus intended to 
provide an authoritative assurance of competence in staff, the impartiality of activities, and the 
reliability of evidence generated by the laboratory.51 The Codes relating to practitioners are values 
and ideals that should define the profession of a forensic practitioner. In total, these standards are the 
minimum requirements expected in order to provide a forensic science service to the criminal justice 
system. Originally published in 2011, the Codes are updated when needed to incorporate relevant 
developments in the forensic field. Some of these changes have resulted in updates in 2016 (Version 
3) and 2017 (Version 4), to reflect the new Criminal Procedure Rules, the Criminal Practice 
Directions, and amendments.52  
In addition to the Codes and appendices, the FSR publishes detailed, stand-alone standards 
and guidance and currently has published in the following areas:  
 
(1) Forensic toxicology standards; 
(2) Sexual assault referral centres and custodial facilities: DNA anticontamination guidance; 
(3) Method validation in digital forensics; 
(4) Crime scene DNA: anticontamination guidance;  
(5) Laboratory DNA: anticontamination guidance; 
(6) Cognitive bias effects relevant to forensic science examinations; 
(7) Forensic service providers: validation guidance; 
(8) Public comment guidance; 
(9) Allele frequency databases and reporting guidance for the DNA-17 profiling; 
(10) Fingerprint examination: terminology, definitions, and acronyms; 
(11) Alcohol back calculation for road traffic investigations; 
(12) Provision of human tissue to the defense; 
(13) Time of death estimations; 
(14) (Draft as of January 2018) DNA mixture interpretation software validation; 
(15) (Draft as of January 2018) DNA mixture interpretation.53 
                                                          
2012 REGARDING DNA EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY LGC FORENSICS 5 (2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118941/dna-contam-
report.pdf [https://.cc/A2WN-PQVT] [hereinafter REPORT INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES].  
50 GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2016–NOVEMBER 
2017 at 9 (2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674761/FSRAnnual_R
eport_2017_v1_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BVQ-KBNS]. 
51 Written Evidence Submitted by the UKAS (FST 0008), HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (Mar. 2016), 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Science%20a
nd%20Technology/Forensic%20Science%20Strategy/written/31189.html [https://perma.cc/FW8V-
CSVP]. 
52 See Rules and Practice Directions, JUSTICE, www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal/rulesmenu-2015 [https://perma.cc/3W6S-WEDU] (last updated April 11, 2017) 
(providing access to the current version of the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice 
Directions). 
53 Publications, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=forensic-science-
regulator&from_date=&keywords=&official_document_status=all&page=1&publication_filter_optio
n=all&to_date=&topics%5B%5D=all&world_locations%5B%5D=all [https://perma.cc/33JS-NTK4] 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (browse list or use the filters on the left-hand column to find specific 
publications). 
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There are also regular updates providing legal guidance on the legal obligations of expert 
witnesses and those involved in forensic pathology investigations54 as well as guidance on other 
related issues, such as: Drug Driving: The Use of Legal Limits;55 Expert Report Content;56 Non-
Technical Expert Statements;57 and Completing the ‘History’ Section of a Forensic Pathologist’s 
Report.58 The FSR has also produced the following guidance: Protocol: Using Casework Material 
for Validation Purposes,59 Protocol on Forensic Science Service Archive Complaints,60 and The Use 
of Photographs for Non-CJS Purposes: Draft Guidance.61 The FSR commissions regular audits of 
the work of forensic pathologists; having published a protocol for these audits, the FSR has published 
the results of five audits.62 Most of these documents have been published after extensive engagement 
with both practitioners and stakeholders as well as the public—with eighteen public consultations to 
date.63  
Another important role of the FSR is to investigate complaints and undertake reviews of 
performance when requested by Parliament. These reports are also publicly available on the website, 
including a performance review of the Scottish Police Services Authority (which provides all forensic 
science services to the Scottish police).64 There have been investigations into the biggest forensic 
providers in the UK, including Cellmark Forensic Services, Key Forensic Services, and LGC 
                                                          
54 Legal Issues in Forensic Pathology and Tissue Retention: Issue 3 Guidance, GOV.UK (Dec. 
10, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-issues-in-forensic-pathology-and-
tissue-retention-issue-2-guidance [https://perma.cc/9DQ2-NY8N]. 
55 Drug Driving: Use of Legal Limits, Issue 2, GOV.UK (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-driving-use-of-legal-limits-issue-2 
[https://perma.cc/9ZVD-NM2J]. 
56 Expert Report Content, GOV.UK (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/expert-report-content [https://perma.cc/5FU5-ZRM4]. 
57 Non-Expert Technical Statements, GOV.UK (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/non-expert-technical-statements 
[https://perma.cc/76NM-MX4T].  
58 Completing the ‘History’ Section of a Forensic Pathologist’s Report, GOV.UK (Sept. 26, 
2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/completing-the-history-section-of-a-forensic-
pathologists-report [https://perma.cc/JN3B-L82V].  
59 Protocol: Using Casework Material for Validation Purposes, GOV.UK (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-using-casework-material-for-validation-
purposes [https://perma.cc/XT46-3QGS].  
60 Protocol on Forensic Science Service Archive Complaints, GOV.UK (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-on-forensic-science-service-archive-
complaints [https://perma.cc/D4AZ-AGWQ]. 
61 Use of Photographs for Non-CJS Purposes: Draft Guidance, GOV.UK (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/use-of-photographs-for-non-cjs-purposes-draft-
guidance [https://perma.cc/RA77-7UUN]. 
62 Forensic Pathology Audit, GOV.UK (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-pathology-audit [https://perma.cc/KK8A-
7YY3]. 
63 See id. 
64 A Performance Review of the Scottish Police Services Authority, GOV.UK (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-performance-review-of-the-scottish-police-services-
authority [https://perma.cc/HN97-6WMB].  
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Forensics.65 In 2013, upon request by Parliament, the FSR also published a preliminary report on the 
use of sodium rhodizonate as a test to identify firearm discharge residue in the early 1970s, 
concluding, however, that a full review was not warranted.66 
 
 
II.   THE FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR: TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS? 
 
There has been clear evidence of engagement by the FSR with a broad variety of stakeholders 
beyond those sitting within specialist groups and on the FSAC. In addition to an annual quality 
conference hosted by the FSR, annual reports give details of a busy schedule of external meetings 
and papers delivered at a wide variety of events. The latest report stresses that there is a “continued 
priority” to speak to as many “forensic experts, practitioners[,] and relevant managers as possible.”67 
The level of engagement has been impressive and is going a long way to achieving “Requirement 3” 
of the Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report: November 2014 – November 2015, which requires 
a “shared understanding of quality and standards by all stakeholders, including commissioners of 
forensic science, expert practitioners, researchers and all end users, including the police, the 
prosecuting authorities, [defense,] and courts.”68 The transparency of the FSR is such that all minutes 
of meetings are promptly published as well as regular newsletters, in addition to all the other 
publications and public consultations. It is to be applauded that the FSR is so transparent and engaged 
with the broader criminal justice community. In the Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report: 
November 2016 – November 2017, the Regulator states, “[T]here should be no doubt that progress is 
being made. The number of organi[z]ations now able to demonstrate objectively the scientific 
validity of their methods and the competence of their staff has increased vastly. Many organi[z]ations 
are well on their way to achieving the required quality standards . . . .”69 However, the Regulator 
concedes that this is an “ongoing process,” and her report goes on to detail the challenges still facing 
the FSR, some of which we detail below.70   
 
A. Continuing Challenges to Forensic Regulation 
 
The Regulator was intended as an oversight body for all forensic science providers in the UK, 
setting national quality standards and ensuring compliance with these standards and the codes of 
practice. However, there are ongoing challenges to ensure that all providers— most importantly the 
police, but also small businesses and experts called upon by the defense—seek and achieve 
accreditation. The persistent lack of compliance from some providers continues to be a problem, 
particularly in light of the government’s refusal to legislate both to provide the Regulator with real 
powers in the face of noncompliance and to put an enhanced admissibility test of scientific evidence 
in the courts on a statutory basis. Without these legislative reforms, the Regulator continues to be 
                                                          
65 LGC were sold to Eurofins, a European forensic service provider, in 2017. Eurofins to 
Reinforce its Forensic Services Portfolio and Footprint with the Acquisition of LGC Forensics, 
EUROFINS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.eurofins.com/media-centre/press-releases-2017/2017-10-12/ 
[https://perma.cc/5R9L-PL66]. 
66 Report on Sodium Rhodizonate, GOV.UK (Jan. 31, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fsr-report-on-sodium-rhodizonate-testing-in-the-1970s 
[https://perma.cc/VXW7-RAVY]. 
67 TULLY, supra note 50, at 33. 
68 GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014–NOVEMBER 
2015, at 4 (2015), http://www.forensic-access.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/24517-
2015_FSR_Annual_Report_v1_0_final_153002.pdf [https://perma.cc/J65H-PQMP]. 
69 TULLY, supra note 50, at 3.  
70 Id. 
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stymied in her efforts. There have also been significant challenges to the FSR in maintaining a steady 
hand in a turbulent marketplace, with financial pressures on both police and private providers seeing 
significant turmoil. These challenges, and the consequences of failure in these areas, will be 
considered before turning to look at whether the introduction of the FSR has raised standards across 
forensic science and the complexities of regulation that are revealed by consideration of the UK 
model.  
B. Incomplete Accreditation and Lack of Compliance 
When published, the Codes were accompanied by a timetable for achieving compliance. In 
her first annual report in 2015, Dr. Tully claimed that “much progress” had been made towards 
compliance.71 However, in the third (current) business plan, the aims include the primary goal of full 
compliance by the end of March 2017.72 Given that the adoption of the Regulator’s quality 
framework was the primary aim of the FSR at the outset a decade ago,73 it is a concern that the 
Regulator is now reporting in 2018 that there are still significant gaps in compliance.74 In particular, 
the message is not positive for small or “micro-businesses” who “have chosen, for financial reasons, 
not to move towards gaining accreditation.”75 In April 2016—as part of collaborative efforts by the 
Chartered Society of Forensic Science, the FSR, and UKAS to create a suitable accreditation scheme 
for sole- and smaller-scale forensic providers—a survey of over 70 forensic scientists found 
approximately 35% of providers were either accredited or working towards accreditation while 65% 
held no accreditation.76 Although the survey did not capture whether a forensic provider was 
represented by single or multiple participants, it provided a worrying insight into the current 
landscape of accreditation in England and Wales when including small and micro-providers. 
The Regulator has often highlighted the difficulties in securing accreditation, and the Select 
Committee, in 2016, echoed particular concerns about police noncompliance, stating that the 
government “must be clear that while some police forces may face particularly challenges in securing 
accreditation, there must be no failure to meet the Regulator’s deadlines.”77 For police in-house 
activities, there is a significant lag between increasing forensic activities undertaken and the adoption 
of relevant quality management systems (QMS). Previous QMS (via accreditation to ISO 9001) 
targeted limited activities, such as DNA recovery and fingerprint enhancement,78 but they do not 
cover all activities now undertaken by police. For example, there is no uniform protocol for the 
classification of firearms across forces involved in the provision of firearms evidence.  
                                                          
71 TULLY, supra note 68, at 4.  
72 Id. at 16. 
73 Id. at 4.  
74 TULLY, supra note 50, at 3.  
75 Id. 
76 Engagement Workshop, 86 INTERFACES 4, 4–6 (2016). Sole traders were 32% of respondents; 
14% represented SME-small providers (50–249 staff), 34% for SME-micro (2–9 staff), 8% for SME-
medium providers, and 12% for large providers (250 or more staff). Id. 
77 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY, 2016–17, HC, ¶ 55 
(UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/501/50102.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PQ2W-DSZV]. 
78 See HOME OFFICE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY: A NATIONAL APPROACH TO FORENSIC 
SCIENCE DELIVERY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2016, Cm. 9217, at 9 (UK) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/506683/54493_Cm_9
217_Forensic_Science_Strategy_Print_ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC3R-G8L8]. Current reports 
show that the number of police forces with accredited QMS for DNA recovery and fingerprint 
enhancement are thirty-four and thirty-six respectively, with sixteen units accredited to other areas. 
Id. at 11–14. 
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Even with UKAS appending supplementary standards onto ISO17025 to make it forensic 
specific, no standard can truly regulate every aspect of a practitioner’s work, even in a highly 
regulated laboratory environment. Even more difficult, if not impossible, is effective oversight of 
crime scene examination and evidence retrieval, particularly where police personnel work without 
external supervision. Scenes of crime examinations pose significant challenges and while included 
within the Regulator’s accreditation schedule (under the ISO17020 standard), few police scientific 
support services are currently accredited.79 Yet, effective oversight of evidence management is 
essential if evidence generated from crime scenes is to be relied upon.  
The latest annual report notes that there has been a particular failure to secure accreditation in 
relation to digital forensics, and the deadline of October 2018 for fingerprint comparison is fast 
approaching without confidence of full compliance by that date (having been moved back 
substantially on several occasions).80 The provision of digital forensic evidence is of particular 
concern at a time when there is a reported decrease in the demand for traditional forensic techniques, 
such as DNA and fingerprints, while the demand for digital forensics is increasing.81 Although there 
has been significant progress in terms of method validation and staff competence, driven by the 
October 2017 deadline for achieving accreditation, as of January 2018, up to thirty commercial 
organizations are providing digital forensics yet just four have gained ISO17025 accreditation.82 The 
Regulator has particular concerns about micro-businesses and sole traders in digital forensics 
postponing the effort and cost of accreditation until the Regulator has powers to force their hand, 
especially when, “[a]rguably, the risks are higher for sole traders, some of whom may not be in 
regular scientific debate with colleagues and may over time become outdated or even marginalized in 
their opinions.”83 
 
C. The Regulator’s Powers 
 
Achieving full compliance then remains challenging, and yet the Regulator must strive 
towards this goal with no significant powers. The FSR was created under the Royal Prerogative, with 
no statutory basis and no powers to enforce standards. The FSR is prevented from using any “direct 
economic measures,” such as fines or other monetary incentives, disincentives, or penalties.84 The 
FSR instead relies upon indirect measures to secure compliance, including “harnessing active support 
from key stakeholders” and using “informal sanctions,” such as 
 
[d]eveloping a climate within which suppliers who are unable to evidence compliance 
with quality standards will find it difficult to secure contracts to supply forensic science 
services to police forces and others; [and] [e]ncouraging courts and counsel to expect 
testimony given by expert witnesses to be underpinned by evidence that the science 
complies with the requisite quality standards.85 
 
In the 2017 annual report, the FSR asserts that those providers “not moving towards 
compliance should be in no doubt that their services will gradually receive fewer commissions and 
                                                          
79 ISO-17025 Mandatory for Digital Forensics in the Criminal Justice System, INTAFORENSICS 
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.intaforensics.com/2017/09/19/iso-17025-mandatory-for-digital-
forensics-in-the-criminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/X3SF-665J]. 
80 TULLY, supra note 50, at 2. 
81 John Flatley, Crime in England and Wales; Year Ending June 2017, OFF. FOR NAT’L STATS., 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandan
dwales/june2017 [https://perma.cc/VS5S-HSBU]. 
82 TULLY, supra note 50, at 11. 
83 Id. 
84 RENNISON, supra note 26, at 1. 
85 Id. at 4. 
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their practitioners will face more challenges in court.”86 Frustration with the lack of government 
action is now apparent, evidenced by the Regulator setting out a chronology of unfulfilled 
government pronouncements dating back to 2005 that promised the Regulator powers. In 2011, the 
Select Committee recommended again that statutory powers be granted, a proposal that the 
government agreed to keep “under review.”87 The Select Committee made the same recommendation 
again in 2013, demanding action by March 2014.88 This led to a public consultation, which the 
government responded to in July 2015, stating that support for statutory powers had been found to be 
very high, and the issue would be addressed in the forthcoming forensic science strategy.89  
The following year duly saw publication of the Forensic Science Strategy, where the 
government proclaimed a vision for forensic science that includes “a clearer system of governance to 
ensure quality standards and proper ethical oversight, and a cost effective service that 
delivers . . . robust and relevant forensic evidence.”90 The document asserts that the “legitimacy and 
capability of forensic science” will be enhanced with proposals developed “to give the Forensic 
Science Regulator statutory powers, put the current remit and the associated Codes of Practice on a 
statutory basis[,] and enable the Forensic Science Regulator to investigate noncompliance where 
necessary.”91 The Select Committee was unconvinced and “left with serious doubts about the 
[g]overnment’s commitment to deliver this.”92 Yet, in 2017, the Regulator reported, “[I]t is becoming 
clear that not all police forces are fully committed to reaching the required standards. . . . Statutory 
powers for the Regulator are now needed in order that those organi[z]ations that have not committed 
the resource and effort required to attain the standards can be induced to do so.”93 
In Parliament later that year, the Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service stated, 
“[W]e committed to place the Forensic Science Regulator on a statutory footing by the end of this 
Parliament. We are seeking the appropriate parliamentary opportunity to do that.”94 As of January 
2018, while appearing tantalizingly close, the “clearer statutory role” promised has still not been 
forthcoming, and proposals for the powers have not yet been publicly revealed. The Regulator says 
that the situation is “disappointing.”95 
Studies have shown a strong link between strong and effective regulatory frameworks and 
sector outcomes,96 and critics of the FSR can point to its inability to authoritatively enforce the 
                                                          
86 TULLY, supra note 50, at 3. 
87 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, SEVENTH REPORT, 
2010–12, HC 855, at 80 (UK).  
88 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, SECOND REPORT, 
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95 TULLY, supra note 50, at 33.  
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adoption and compliance of the standards.97 The Codes are not mandated by law, but their 
compliance is meant to be “not optional.”98 Yet, providers lacking accreditation are still able to 
undertake work while others “that have met the quality standards have not yet been fully rewarded 
through the contracting process.”99 Like its predecessor the CRFP, the FSR is ultimately hampered 
by lack of enforcement powers. This has also permitted providers—most obviously the police—the 
ability to dictate the pace of adoption of quality standards. Accreditation remains an additional but 
optional “cost,” with some providers—including the police—avoiding the stringent quality measures 
required for accreditation.100  
 
D. Forensic Regulation and the Courts 
 
Without statutory powers, the Regulator relies upon cooperation and external requirements, 
such as the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice Directions, to effect compliance with the 
Codes.101 Prosecutors, lawyers, and judges are thereby incorporated into the quality control 
machinery for forensic science. However, this is frustrated by courts that continue to admit evidence 
from nonaccredited laboratories or experts (which they are perfectly entitled to do). The courts in 
England and Wales are required to make decisions about admissibility in line with the Criminal 
Practice Directions, which gives an indicative list of factors to consider, ultimately hoping this will 
ensure only “sufficiently reliable” scientific evidence is admitted at trial.102 But are they competent to 
make informed choices and decisions? Are the police mindful of such criteria, particularly when the 
majority of forensic evidence never reaches a courtroom and may simply be used to “steer” a police 
inquiry or be used as “intelligence”? 
The gatekeeping role of trial judges in ensuring the reliability of expert evidence has been 
extensively discussed in common law jurisdictions with admissibility standards widely debated.103 
However, attempts at scientific rigor have encountered many challenges in adversarial courtrooms. 
The admission and examination of scientific evidence in English criminal trials is subject to a 
complex set of evidentiary rules and procedural practices, which do not smoothly align with accepted 
scientific principles. While trial counsel can always cross-examine an expert witness on the expert’s 
qualifications, experience, and expertise, neither lawyers nor judges are generally well qualified to 
assess scientific practice or standards,104 with courts still “unable to tell the difference between 
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‘expert opinion’ and ‘scientific evidence,’ too often retreating into the simplistic default assumption 
that everything said by a bona fide expert is necessarily ‘scientific.’”105  
In lieu of requiring formal registration or professional accreditation as a precondition of 
admissibility, courts might rationally opt instead to insist upon forensic professionals working within 
an “accredited” or quality-assured laboratory (or equivalent environment). This transposes quality 
assurance from the individual to the institutional level. What we have seen, however, is institutional 
accreditation remains patchy, with many gaps, particularly among police organizations and small 
businesses (particularly those who undertake defense work). The flaws with this regulatory 
framework remain in a marketplace where accreditation is expensive yet optional, and police are 
continuing to take forensic work in-house without seeking accreditation.  
 
E. Police Provision and the Forensic “Market” 
The FSR was expected to fill the vacuum of regulation and solve the problems identified in a 
growing number of critical reports. Yet, the existence of a regulator was to prove even more critical 
when the government announced at the end of 2010 that it was to close the Forensic Science Service, 
a body previously looked to for national standards and advice, heralding a move by the UK into 
unchartered waters: a completely private national forensic science market.106 The FSR had referred to 
a “fully functioning market with the right services, at the right price, delivered to the appropriate 
standard” in the first business plan in 2008,107 stating that it was essential for the integrity of the 
criminal justice system, that “a level playing field exists for all suppliers and that quality standards 
are maintained in the face of the growing market and increased competition.”108 The role and success 
of the FSR was then crucial to ensuring the sustainability of a wholly profit-driven marketplace and 
the avoidance of a “race to the bottom”.   
Closure of the Forensic Science Service and public sector austerity measures have encouraged 
police services to take more forensic work in-house. While the lack of accurate or accessible data on 
spending on forensic science services has been regularly identified as problematic,109 the Home 
Office admits to a decline in police spending on external forensic services of about 40% between 
2010 and 2015/16,110 with expected further falls of 3% in 2016/17.111 Independent research 
concludes that “the continued fall in spending put more pressure on the [private sector forensic 
service providers’] turnover and profitability and, therefore, poses questions about the sustainability 
of the market.”112  
While the police increase their forensic workload, the marketplace for forensic service 
providers then shrinks, leaving providers vulnerable and the market lacking resilience. Indeed, there 
have been few “success” stories of flourishing businesses with “big” players cross-subsidizing the 
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forensic arms of their business. Of the “full service forensics providers,”113 LGC Forensics recently 
sold its business to a European company,114 while Key Forensics, the third of the big three providers, 
went into administration in January 2018, leaving just two providers standing.115 Meanwhile, many 
small businesses have been unable to continue operating. This has led to a dangerous situation with 
respect to available expertise in some disciplines, particularly fiber analysis and other less often used 
techniques. The Regulator reports that there are now only twelve fully qualified toxicology reporting 
officers in England and Wales.116 Demonstrating the fragility of the market and the risks that this 
poses, the collapse of digital forensics providers can leave police and defense solicitors trying to 
retrieve data and raising significant problems over chain of custody authentication. The Metropolitan 
Police have also been forced into spending millions of pounds to keep Key Forensics afloat for three 
months, while they finished work on thousands of live criminal cases from thirty police forces.117  
Such business failures require expensive contingency plans, and yet the privatization of the 
market was intended to save government money by introducing competition, which would lead to a 
reduction in the price of services. By creating a competitive market where prices must be low to win 
contracts, some forensic providers are unable to continue supplying cost-effective services. This 
becomes even more problematic by additionally asking struggling providers to meet the significant 
costs of accreditation. The Regulator has commented that it may not be simply a matter of the 
commercialization of forensic science, but that “too much money has been and is continuing to be 
driven out of forensic science provision.”118   
At the same time as police forces undertaking more forensics work internally creates risks to 
the market, “[p]rivate sector companies are concerned that police force laboratories may be able to 
operate more cheaply by using police premises without charge or by delaying meeting UK 
accreditation standards.”119 As seen, police in-house forensic services are not yet uniformly subject to 
the same quality standards that apply to commercial providers, even though it was stated in the 
original 2008 business plan that “differential standards would operate against the public interest and 
increase the risk of challenge in the courts.”120 It is difficult to see how lower standards for police 
forensics could be in the public interest, and such different standards increase the risk of flawed 
results being relied upon or challenged in the courts. Indeed, the police-led initial screening and 
selection of exhibits for testing is often the most critical point in the forensic process. Poor decision-
making at this juncture, contamination of exhibits, or weak chain of custody records, jeopardizes any 
further testing that may be undertaken under stricter quality regimes. Criminal prosecutions, such as 
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the infamous Irish Republican Army bombing in Omagh, were ultimately defeated by poor police 
practices at the crime scene and an ambiguous chain of custody for exhibits.121  
 
III.   RAISING STANDARDS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE?  
 
Given that the FSR was created in the shadow of miscarriages of justice and concerns about 
the quality of forensic science provision, with the ultimate aim of regulation being the assurance that 
all forensic evidence is of a high quality, have standards been raised in the UK? A reliable answer 
would require an accurate gauge to measure standards pre- and post-creation of the FSR, which does 
not exist. But if one were to expect that errors, mistakes, or misconduct were now becoming 
consigned to history, then the FSR role in investigating complaints would be diminishing. Yet, the 
converse is true: increasing numbers of cases are being reported to the FSR for investigation. While it 
may be reassuring that at least now we are hearing of errors etc. and that the standards regime ensures 
that errors are now recognised and addressed, there is still ample room for concern. 
By 2013, sixty complaints were received by the first FSR during his five-year tenure.122 
Between 2015 and 2016, however, quality complaints rose from thirty-six to fifty-seven, rising again 
to sixty-five in 2016–2017,123 with an increase in the complexity of the reported issues and risks 
categorized as low, medium, or high according to the severity of the failure and potential 
consequences. Fourteen complaints were considered “high risk” in 2016–2017.124 Some cases have 
been “near misses,” such as DNA contamination at the LGC forensic laboratory in 2012.125 Adam 
Scott had been charged with rape in October 2011 after a plastic tray containing a sample of his DNA 
(from the unconnected earlier sample) was re-used in the analysis of a swab from the rape victim, 
providing a DNA “match” in the rape case.126  He denied traveling the 190 miles from his home to 
the scene of the crime, and his lawyer pressed for further testing, uncovering the error, despite LGC 
Forensics initially failing to consider contamination when the investigating officer raised concerns 
about the DNA match.127 Charges were eventually dropped, while some 26,000 other samples were 
re-tested with no further errors identified.128 In another contamination case, during a lengthy and 
perplexing police investigation into the death of an MI6 employee, forensic scientists provided police 
with a DNA profile from the bag in which the body was found.129 The police subsequently spent a 
year attempting to trace the individual responsible for leaving the DNA, to no avail. It was later 
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discovered that an individual manually entering the DNA profile had transposed the numbers “three” 
and “five.”130 This typographical error led to the costly pursuit of a nonexistent individual.131 
The FSR’s post-investigation measures—ranging from advice on steps to avoid recurrence of 
the issue to modifying standards and guidance—are influenced by the issues raised. Again, without 
meaningful powers, such “advisory” measures are all that can be expected. Yet, the cost of errors and 
malpractice are significant, notwithstanding the serious risk of miscarriages of justice and the 
reputational harm to the criminal justice system. While the Codes seek to reduce the risk of mistakes, 
no accreditation can prevent a scientist from faltering or employees within accredited organizations 
from consciously or unwittingly engaging in malpractice. The expansion of private sector provision 
and police in-house services—with a demand for profitable (for the private sector forensic service 
providers), cost-effective, and sustainable provision—have increased the complexity of the 
environment with some routine forensic testing now subcontracted to nonspecialists or undertaken by 
less qualified police personnel.  
And yet there is still heavy reliance upon the professional integrity of individual practitioners. 
It was not long ago that even forensic scientists themselves conceded that forensic science is not 
sufficiently well-developed as a profession to have the full characteristics of a profession in place.132 
Practitioners may face institutional pressures, which are supposedly balanced by their scientific 
professionalism; however, customers demanding “useful” scientific assistance may choose other 
providers who are more obliging or refuse to pay for inconclusive test results. And what about the 
situation where the scientist is aware that a potentially exculpatory test has not been ordered? There 
is no legal duty to pursue every conceivable avenue of scientific inquiry or every possibility of 
exculpation, and police will rarely order extensive tests (with their eye on budgets). Private 
consultants are constrained by costs and keeping their customers happy, hoping to gain a reputation 
for satisfying consumer expectations, in order to win and retain market share.  
High-profile miscarriages of justice in England and Wales fan suspicions that scientists may 
be too easily influenced by the police when undertaking forensic testing and reporting results. The 
Codes state that all forensic practitioners should be governed by the principles of “independence, 
impartiality[,] and integrity.”133 According to the Regulator, organizational structures do not hinder 
working to these principles,134 yet this seems overly optimistic if a scientist is directly employed by, 
or works directly alongside, the police. While one might wish to believe in the integrity of all law 
enforcement and forensic science personnel wherever institutionally located, it would be naive to 
abandon quality assurance mechanisms and frameworks to wishful thinking. 
 
IV.   THE CHALLENGE OF FORENSIC REGULATION 
 
The FSR initially articulated a “risk model,” identifying five categories of risk: the generation 
of evidence which contributes to a miscarriage of justice (false convictions or false acquittals); 
evidence which misleads or fails to contribute where possible to a criminal investigation; situations 
where there is a “public interest” (left undefined); and conditions threatening market failure.135 
Utilizing a risk model requires quantification of the “risk” posed by any particular procedure or 
practice. Thus, there must be an error rate—corresponding to identifiable errors—or known 
limitations of any given method. However, a significant flaw in the Regulator’s risk model is that 
relevant error rates and limitations for common forensic science techniques remain largely 
undetermined.  
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Even assuming the injection of significant further resources to produce robust error rates, it is 
questionable whether risks can be meaningfully quantified given the inherently contextual nature of 
forensic science evidence. Without known error rates, can a laboratory profess to be working within 
acceptable parameters? Who decides what level of error is “acceptable”? For example, how often 
should an acceptable system of fingerprint analysis be expected to produce false “matches”? What 
range of false “matches” is compatible with a practitioner or laboratory performing to an acceptable 
standard? Such questions, of course, are not purely scientific. Acceptability turns, in part, upon the 
criminal justice system’s values and public tolerance of forensic errors. Significant further research 
into error rates, forensic techniques, technological limitations, and practitioner bias needs to be 
undertaken before an effective risk model can be designed and implemented. 
Even with dedicated resources (including significant research funding), there are still inherent 
difficulties in reaching agreement on areas of ongoing scientific controversy. Recent debates 
surrounding Low Template DNA demonstrate that forensic scientists may become entrenched in 
opposing views.136 Yet, the risk model anticipates scientists providing “definite answers to regulatory 
problems that may be urgent and pressing but that science may not be able to solve categorically.”137 
If forensic scientists themselves cannot resolve a dispute over whether a technique or practice is 
reliable, how should a Regulator proceed? The scientific community cannot always provide the 
unanimous answers required for risk assessment. Indeed, to expect them to do so is to misunderstand 
the nature of a scientific endeavour, which is always pushing against the boundaries of current 
orthodoxy. But, such disputes foster widely discrepant forensic practices, with techniques deemed 
acceptable in some countries, or by some forensic science providers, and rejected by others. 
The Regulator has also pointed out the gap left when accreditation becomes the focus of an 
organization ignoring other vital issues, such as the “loss of exhibits; compromise of exhibit integrity; 
method failures; poor performance in proficiency tests; and internal inconsistencies in reports not 
being identified.”138 There is also the countervailing difficulty of encouraging innovation and 
ongoing development within regulatory parameters. This demands some measure of regulatory 
flexibility and pluralism. As Brown and Willis have argued, “ . . . it is a misconception that best 
practice standard protocols must be set that must then be followed by all. That approach would set 
forensic science in aspic and be counterproductive.”139 A difficult balance must be struck between 
strict adherence to quality-assured protocols and ensuring that practitioners can still innovate and 
exercise professional judgment in difficult cases to achieve the optimal outcome.  
In the final analysis, a risk-based regulatory system does not ensure quality but is aimed at 
prioritizing or mitigating crises. The recent scandal at Randox Testing Services (RTS)140 is the 
perfect example of post-crisis regulation, with the Regulator called upon to examine and explain the 
events at one toxicology laboratory. The Regulator explained, “Although RTS held accreditation to 
the appropriate quality standard, the malpractice was not discovered by the usual quality checks.”141 
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The laboratory was ISO certified and yet quality control data were manipulated, resulting in a major 
police inquiry (with two individuals facing criminal charges), impacting a reported 10,000 cases that 
all now need some degree of re-investigation.142 This is similar to the food regulatory system in the 
European Union, which might be viewed as “a prime example of regulation in response to major 
crises rather than in anticipation of everyday problems.”143 In practice, political crisis induced by a 
wrongful conviction or public scandal may be necessary to provoke regulatory intervention,144 but 
this reaction may come too late for individuals who cannot be adequately compensated for their loss 
of liberty, or a public whose trust in science and the administration of justice is irreparably 
damaged.145  
Regulators need to be omnipotent and very quick on their feet. In reality, because “regulatory 
agencies have limited staff and financial resources, there will always be competition between various 
functions for priority.”146 The field of forensic science constantly faces new challenges, and it may be 
doubted that any regulatory system could always respond or react quickly enough to new “threats.” 
In addition, the classic regulatory risk analysis approach relies heavily on scientific risk assessment, 
typically taking little (if any) account of sociological, economic, ethical, or even legal considerations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The introduction of the Regulator in the UK was a significant innovation, intended to create a 
generic standard for forensic science providers with “a light touch” in steering service providers 
toward accreditation. While NAS recommended mandatory accreditation for both laboratories and 
scientists as well as sanctions against transgressors (but not automatic exclusion of substandard 
evidence),147 the FSR has had to rely upon “soft” implementation. The adoption of the FSR 
standards—whether by police forces or commercial providers—remains voluntary, and consequently, 
partial. The Regulator still lacks meaningful enforcement powers, and despite a promising start, 
regulation of UK forensic sciences is still too often patchy, superficial, and lacking teeth. Of course, 
like the rest of the UK public sector, the Regulator must contend with financial stringency. Indeed, 
the entire criminal justice system, but forensic science services in particular, are being starved of 
funds, with commentators warning that the entire system is on the brink of collapse.148 
Ultimately, the role of the FSR was envisaged as far more significant than simply setting and 
monitoring standards, ensuring accreditation, and dealing with complaints. The overarching goal was 
to answer those critics who decried the contribution that forensic science appeared to make toward 
miscarriages of justice. The FSR, after all, was born out of recommendations contained in scathing 
reports often following high-profile wrongful convictions. The FSR responds that reducing the risk of 
quality failings would impede or prevent “the identification, prosecution[,] and conviction of 
offenders.”149 Declaring success in this role would require making some grand claims, which would 
                                                          
technology/Correspondence/171121-Norman-Lamb-to-Forensic-Science-Regulator-Randox.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C6GC-Q5ML]. 
142 TULLY, supra note 50 at 6.  
143 Zurek, supra note 137, at 1. 
144 Carole McCartney & Stephanie Roberts, Building Institutions to Address Miscarriages of 
Justice in England and Wales: “Mission Accomplished?” 80 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2013).  
145 Michael McConville & Lee Bridges, Keeping Faith with their own Convictions: The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 3, 4 (1994). 
146 OECD, THE GOVERNANCE OF REGULATORS 36 (2014). 
147 A PATH FORWARD, supra note 2, at 25–26.  
148 See Owen Bowcott, Underfunded Justice System ‘Crumbling’, Top Criminal Barrister Says, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/jan/29/underfunded-
justice-system-crumbling-top-criminal-barrister-says [https://perma.cc/8HUY-ML4F]. 
149 BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 19.  
21 
 
be extremely difficult to satisfactorily evidence. There clearly remains an obvious risk of wrongful 
convictions with reliance upon unsupervised or unregulated scientists, or upon unscientific 
techniques. This risk is increased when police personnel are working unsupervised and clearly 
lacking independence and impartiality.  
Poor scientific and professional standards destabilize public confidence in forensic science 
and consequently has an impact upon confidence in the criminal process. Wrongful convictions may 
flourish in a culture that fails to scrutinize and question forensic evidence; instances of flawed 
science, charlatans, nondisclosure, and misinterpretation of evidence are easy to locate both 
domestically and internationally. In a climate where adversarialism is being eroded, where science is 
granted special credence, and expert witnesses gain credibility as guarantors of “accurate” findings of 
guilt, there can then be created a dangerous “technological tyranny.”150 
Given that it is essential that all forensic evidence is reliable and valid—whether used at trial, 
during an investigation, or held as intelligence by law enforcement agencies—there must be systems 
in place to ensure the quality of forensic evidence from the very outset of the criminal process, until 
the very end. This requires regulation and oversight of forensic science from the crime scene to the 
courtroom, quality assurance standards for the education, training, and operation of forensic 
scientists, and the quality assurance and accreditation of scientists’ working environments and 
practices. Yet, there is clearly a need for more attention to the delivery of forensic services, 
practitioner training, standard setting, monitoring, and implementation across the entire sector. 
Further, research is required to determine error rates and limitations of particular techniques and to 
develop effective institutional responses to risks of observer bias and human error.151 Many of the 
safeguards against wrongful convictions must reside within fair and rational legal rules and the 
professional working cultures. Such safeguards are fostered by appropriate training and management, 
and assured by accreditation, quality assurance, and validation processes among the police, 
prosecution, forensic science, judiciary, and advocates. Nevertheless, whatever care is expended, 
mistakes are inevitable, and so effective processes for remedying error remain essential even after 
conviction. 
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